Abstract-The deployment of the components of distributed systems is now often very dynamic -server-side components are virtualised so they can be dynamically deployed on a range of platforms including public and private clouds, while users expect to be able to install clients on devices from phones to tablets. This can introduce security problems that place data at risk. This paper describes a new method for modeling the security of a distributed application and generating the set of possible deployment options that meet the overall security requirements. The model encompasses the entities that influence the security of a distributed system: data, services networks and platforms (e.g. clouds, devices and "things"). The paper describes the method and how it can be used to answer a range of security questions, using a set of case studies including federated clouds and mobile clients.
I. INTRODUCTION
The components of distributed systems are now far more dynamically deployed than in the past. Server-side components are now often virtualised and dynamically deployed on a range of platforms, including public and private clouds, in order to meet changing performance and cost requirements. Similarly, users want to be able to deploy clients on a diverse set of devices (desktops, laptops, tablets, smartphones). This is increasingly true even for corporate applications.
It has not always been like this. Ten years ago, a typical organisation would deploy its server-side software on fixed machines within its own machine room, while users would be limited to using a very restricted set of clients that were owned and carefully managed by the organisation.
The situation has changed mainly due to user expectations and the need to reduce IT costs. Users now expect access to corporate software applications at anytime, from anywhere and from any device. Recently, users have come to expect that they should be able to access these applications from their own devices: many users now prefer to buy their own devices, such as tablets, and use them for work in preference to a lessattractive standard corporate laptop or desktop. This mobile, "Bring Your Own Device" (BYOD) culture raises a range of challenging security issues, including:
• is it safe to deploy a client on an unknown, user-managed BYOD?
• is it safe for corporate data to be transferred to and from mobile clients over home broadband, coffee-shop Wi-Fi and phone networks?
In parallel with this, there is a move to the more dynamic deployment of virtualised, server-side software components on a range of platforms -including clouds -in order to meet changing demand and reduce costs. This also raises security issues, including:
• which components can be safely deployed on a public cloud? • which data items can be safely transferred over the Internet to and from a public cloud?
More recently, the introduction of the "Internet of Things" into the distributed systems ecosystem has added another layer of security concerns, with software storing and transmitting sensor data that may be sensitive. For example, data from sensors in the home being transmitted to an application running in the cloud might reveal when the occupants are away.
The typical current approach to addressing this problem is manual and ad-hoc -a human expert will consider a possible deployment plan and decide if it meets the security requirements. This raises numerous concerns:
• the possibility of human error compromising security • the inability to make very dynamic decisions, for example to understand whether moving a service from a private cloud to a public cloud to handle a performance spike ("cloud-bursting") would break the security requirements • the lack of an audit trail explaining the decision so that it can be reviewed This paper addresses these problems by introducing an alternative: a systematic method to model and reason about the deployment of distributed systems in order to meet security requirements. At its heart is a way to formally model the set of entities that determine the security of a distributed system: the services from which it is composed, the data that these services produce and consume, the networks over which the data is transferred, and the platforms on which the services are deployed.
Once the application has been modelled, the paper introduces a method that allows the use of the model for the exploration and validation of the security of an application in terms of these entities. This can be used in two main ways:
• if an administrator specifies the required security levels for the services and data in an application, the platform on which each service is to be deployed, and the networks it utilises, then the method can determine whether or not the application's security requirements will be met.
• if an administrator specifies the required security levels for services and data, and the range of platforms on which each service could potentially be deployed, the method can generate all deployment options that meet the security requirements (if any exist). Due to mobility, not all these deployment questions can be answered exclusively at the application's initial deployment time: for example clients may roam across mobile networks. Therefore, there is the need for a new application support framework that enforces the use of the method described in this paper for dynamic decision-making when there are changes in the underlying system, such as network roaming.
The new methods presented in this paper build on our previous work [1] but extend it in significant ways:
• the ability to model networks has been added • the previous method was restricted to workflows; the new method can be applied to any distributed system, including clouds, clients running on devices from which users access cloud-based applications (e.g. mobile phones, laptops and tablets), and "things" such as sensors in the Internet of Things which transmit data to cloud applications for analysis, or are controlled by those applications • a new way to model and reason about the security of the system: this combines greater simplicity with increased generality A tool has been built to implement the method so that users can explore security and deployment options. The tool also automatically generates reports (exploiting L A T E X), and so all the equations, security lattices, results and tables in this paper have been generated automatically in this way.
The paper is structured as follows: it firstly introduces the new model used to represent security requirements; next it shows how that model can be applied to represent distributed systems; it then shows how the model can be used to answer security questions in a set of case studies involving federated clouds and network roaming. All the case studies are drawn from real-world examples of the challenges faced by industry and researchers wanting to exploit the benefits of cloud computing.
II. A MODEL FOR REPRESENTING MULTI-LEVEL
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS The security model takes into account service, data, device and network security. It is based on the multi-level security models that have dominated security modeling for the past decades, in particular Bell-LaPadula [2] .
The entities modeled are: Platform the underlying hardware and software platforms on The data sent from service i port x to service j port y l(z)
The security location of z c(z)
The clearance of z (the max l at which z may operate) TABLE I LEXICAL CONVENTIONS which the application is deployed. Examples are the Microsoft and Amazon Clouds, an organisation's data centre, an employee's BYOD cellphone, and a corporate tablet. Network the fixed or mobile networks connecting the platforms on which the application's services are deployed. Service a software component within the application. We model applications as a set of communicating services Data the services communicate by passing data between them We model applications as a directed graph in which the nodes represent the services, while the edges represent the communications between them. The security requirements of an application are then represented as a conjunction of inequalities that are generated by a set of rules. We now define these rules using the lexical conventions in Table 1. For each service s i in the application graph, we add the following inequality:
(the security level of the platform on which the service is deployed must be greater than or equal to that of the service.) For each edge (data connection) d i.x−j.y in the application graph we add the following inequalities:
(the security level of the platform on which the service transmitting the data is deployed must be greater than or equal to that of the data.)
(the security level of the platform on which the service receiving the data is deployed must be greater than or equal to that of the data.)
(the security level of the network across which the data is transmitted must be greater than or equal to that of the data.) We can also represent these inequalities as shown in the lattice diagram of Figure 1 , in which the arrows represent a "≥" relationship. This method can be used to model any arbitrary application consisting of components that communicate. Consider first a simple application involving two services, one of which (Service 1) produces data that is consumed by the other (Service 2). An example would be that the producer is a sensor, which intermittently sends a reading to a cloud based application -the consumer -that stores and analyses the readings. Applying the above rules to the two services and one data connection allows this application to be modeled as the set of inequalities shown in Equation 5:
III. DATA SECURITY CONSTRAINTS So far, we have not considered any constraints on the security relationship between data and services. The method we have presented is extensible and allows for the addition of other security constraints relating to data. This could range from the very basic, in which we impose a simple constraint that the security level of a service must be greater than or equal to that of any data that it reads. Or it could be more sophisticated, for example incorporating the modified BellLaPadula method [2] that was introduced for workflows in [1] . We now show how this can be generalised to any distributed system, and represented in the new method presented in this paper.
To model this form of Bell-LaPadula, the following inequalities are added to the security lattice:
For each service s i in the application graph, we add the following inequality:
where c(s i ) represents the clearance of the service: its maximum security location For each edge (data connection) d i.x−j.y in the application graph we add the following inequalities: (the Bell-LaPadula "no read up" rule)
(the Bell-LaPadula "no write down" rule)
IV. USING THE SETS OF INEQUALITIES TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT DEPLOYMENT Once the security constraints of the distributed system have been modeled as a set of inequalities, it is possible to answer questions about valid deployment options. We first describe in general terms how this can be achieved; the remainder of the paper then shows how questions from the set of case studies can be answered.
In every case, answering questions takes place in two stages: 1) where there are variables in the inequalities that represent real-world entities whose security levels are known and fixed, bind those variables to those known security levels 2) Simplify the resulting set of inequalities This can generate one of three results:
• the security constraints can not be met • the security constraints can be met • there are specific values (or ranges of values) that the unbound variables can take that would allow the security constraints to be met Examples of each of these types of results will be given for the case studies presented later. However, we first explain the simplification process.
All the inequalities that are generated are of the form a ≥ b where a and b are variables. We represent specific security levels, to which variables can be bound, as integers, with higher values representing higher levels of security. The following rules are then used to simplify the set of inequalities (we use i and j to represent integers, and v to represent variables). Considering first each inequality consisting of a comparison between two integers:
If this is true then it can be removed from the set of inequalities (as the conjunction of any logical expression E AND T RUE is E); if it is false then the security requirements of the application cannot be met (as the conjunction of any logical expression E AND F ALSE is F ALSE). Next, consider pairs of inequalities, involving a specific variable v, that are of the form: These can be replaced by the single inequality
Also, inequalities of the form:
can be replaced by the single inequality
This process of simplification results in one of: a conjunction of a set of inequalities containing the unbound variables, the discovery that there are no variable values that can be satisfied, or the discovery that the given variable bindings mean that the security requirements have been met. We now show how this process of binding and simplification is used to answer security questions in a set of case studies drawn from examples of attempts to exploit clouds by industry or researchers.
V. CASE STUDIES
This section presents two case studies to illustrate the application and generality of the method.
A. Case Study: Federated Clouds
In [1] , a method was presented for determining valid deployment options for a healthcare workflow. The aim was to determine the possible ways to partition a workflow across a set of federated clouds so as to meet security constraints. A cost model could then be used to select from the valid options. We will now show that the method of inequalities introduced in this paper can be used to solve this problem more simply than in [1] , while also including network security. The workflow is shown in Figure 2 -it is a four service pipeline for analysing accelerometer data. Applying the above rules to the four services and three connections allows this application to be modelled as the set of inequalities. The original paper's model included Bell-LaPadula, but could not encompass network security, which we can now include due to the extended method presented in this paper. The set of inequalities is shown in equation 14, which can also be represented by the security lattice shown in Figure 3 .
Next, we bind all the variables to the values from the original paper, leaving only those representing the security locations of the four platforms. These bindings are shown in Table II . The example used only two levels: 0 (representing low security) and 1 (representing high security). The key point about the example is that the workflow first reads a file that contains confidential medical information about a patient, along with the output of a medical sensor. The "Anonymise" service then removes the confidential parts of the file, leaving only the sensor data collected from the patient. This is then analysed to produce a summary of the patient's health. Therefore, while the initial data is confidential (security level 1) and needs to be stored securely, the anonymised data is low security (level 0). Simplifying the resulting set of inequalities using the rules given above produces the result in equation 16.
Given the availability of a set of real clouds, with known security levels, equation 15 can be used as the basis for generating all possible valid deployment options as will now be explained.
It is common for organisations to utilise two clouds: one internal "Public" (with security level 0) and "Private" (with level 1). This gives four possible solutions to the inequalities of 15. These are shown in Table III (these solutions were generated by the tool described later in the paper). 
Another way to represent this is through the diagram in Figure 4 (the red border surrounds services on the private cloud, the green the public cloud). In order to chose between the options, a cost model such as that in [1] could be used.
Determining all valid options can also be used to assess risks to application availability. Inspection of Table III or Figure 4 shows that the application is entirely dependent on the private cloud: if it fails then there are no options available to run the application sufficiently securely. In response to this knowledge, the organisation may choose to acquire access to a second private cloud to use if the main one fails.
B. Case Study: Network Security
The new method also allows us to explore the security implications of the networks used to transfer data between the services of an application -for example from a service running in a cloud, to a mobile device acting as a client. There are two ways in which this can be done: 1) if the security location of a network is known then the variable representing it can be bound to that value 2) if the security location of a network is unknown then the variable representing it can be left free so that any constraints on its value can be determined For example, consider the earlier producer consumer system which was modeled by Equation 5 combined with the variable bindings shown in Table IV . The network security location is not bound, and so simplifying the resulting equation gives the range of possible valid values for the network location. This is shown in equation 16.
Alternatively, if the network location is known then the variable can be bound to this value. For example, if the network location is 0, then simplifying the equation gives the value "False", showing that it is impossible to build a system meeting the security requirements of the data and services using a network with this low level of security.
VI. RELATED WORK This paper is a major development of the ideas found in an earlier paper [1] , which took a similar, but more restricted approach and applied it to cloud security. Unlike the new method, it was unable to handle general distributed systems, nor networks. The method in [1] was further formalised in [4] .
The method presented in this paper requires the assignment of security levels to platforms, services, data and networks. Ways of achieving this are discussed in [7] and [8] .
Recently, there have been other papers discussing the allocation of services to cloud resources in order to meet security requirements. [10] describes a method of partitioning workflow over clouds. It incorporates the security constraints of [1] , and adds others (e.g. for keeping entities together or apart); it also introduces a method for optimising the placement of partitions on clouds to meet QoS requirements. It limits its focus to workflow (rather than general distributed systems) and does not consider network security or mobility.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We believe that it is important to have a formalised, auditable method for reasoning about security decisions relating to deploying distributed systems across a range of platforms. This is increasingly important given the wide range of platforms now available, ranging from highly scalable clouds (both public and private), through mobile devices, to the sensors ("things") that are now proliferating. Before we devised the method in this paper, and its more limited predecessor [1] we often found ourselves having to make manual judgements about how to partition complex, sensitive applications across a set of platforms (often public and private clouds). The consequences of making an error could have been great in terms of regulation and trust. For example, some of our projects involve healthcare applications in which placing patient data at risk could have severe consequences. This could be due to sending sensitive data over insecure networks, storing it on insecure platforms, or allowing untrusted, low-security services to operate on it. We therefore set out to design a method to avoid this.
In this paper we have described this new method for modelling the security requirements of distributed systems that run on multiple platforms, along with a way to determine valid options for deploying the components of the distributed system. We believe the approach to be completely general, and have shown its utility through a set of case studies drawn from real applications in industry and research involving clouds, devices and "things". One major advance over the earlier work in [1] is in the addition of the ability to model networks. The motivation for adding this capability was a use-case from industry involving the security of systems with clients running on mobile devices -focussing solely on the back-end of systems running on clouds was no longer sufficient to ensure system security.
All the equations and tables in this paper, as well as the security lattice of Figure 3 are generated by the tool, which reduces the risk of mistakes being made due to transcription errors. When combined with a cost model (as in [1] ) the tool can also be used to automatically generate, deploy and execute the partitions of the distributed applications on a set of platforms. We have implemented and evaluated this for e-Science Central -an open-source cloud workflow platform [11] . Our current research is in integrating this work with exceptionhandling and fault recovery in order to deal efficiently with cases where clouds fail [12] , or become available, during the execution of an application.
